| abstract | - Marshal Luxembourg, having with a series of feints induced William to detach portions of his army, rapidly drew together superior numbers in the face of the Allied camps, which lay in a rough semicircle from Eliksem on the right to Neerlanden, thence along the Landen brook on the left (18–28 July 1693). William had no mind to retire over the Gete River and entrenched a strong line from Laar through Neerwinden to Neerlanden. On the right of this line (Laar to Neerwinden), the ground was broken and gave plenty of cover to both sides; this section, being regarded as the key to the position, was strongly garrisoned. In the centre the open ground between Neerwinden and Neerlanden was solidly entrenched; in front of it Rumsdorp was held as an advance post. The left at Neerlanden rested upon the Landen brook and was difficult to access. William's right (his line of retreat lay over the Gete) was his dangerous flank, and Marshal Luxembourg was aware that the Allies' front was somewhat long for the numbers defending it. The intervention of troops drawn from one wing to reinforce the other would almost certainly be too late. Under these conditions Luxembourg's general plan was to throw the weight of his attack on the Laar-Neerwinden section—especially on Neerwinden itself—and to economize his forces, as "economy of force" was understood before Napoleon's time. Elsewhere, delivering holding attacks or demonstrations, as might be necessary, would thus prevent the Allied centre and left from assisting the right. Marshal Luxembourg had about 80,000 men to William's 50,000. Opposite the entrenchments of the centre he drew up nearly the whole of his cavalry in six lines, with two lines of infantry intercalated. A corps of infantry and dragoons was held off for the attack on Neerlanden and Rumsdorp. The troops destined for the main attack, 28,000 of all arms, formed up in heavy masses opposite Neerwinden. This proportion of about one-third of the whole force to be employed in the decisive attack in the event proved insufficient. The troops opposite the Allied centre and left had to act with the greatest energy to fulfill their containinment mission. At Laar-Neerwinden the eventual success of the attack was bought only at the price of the utter exhaustion of the troops. After a long cannonade the French columns moved to the attack, converging on Neerwinden; a smaller force assaulted Laer. The edge of the villages was carried, but in the interior a murderous struggle began, every foot of ground being contested. After a time William himself, leading a heavy counterattack, expelled the assailants from both villages. A second attack, pushed with the same energy, was met with the same determination. Meanwhile, the French in other parts of the field had pressed their attacks home. The six lines of cavalry in the centre, after enduring the fire of the Allies for many hours, trotted over the open ground and up to the entrenchments to meet with certain defeat. At Neerlanden and Rumsdorp there was severe hand-to-hand fighting. Meantime, the two intact lines of infantry in the French centre had been moved to their left and formed the nucleus for the last great assault on Neerwinden, which proved too much for the exhausted defenders. They fell back slowly and steadily, defying pursuit—the English Coldstream Guards even captured a colour. However, at this crisis the initiative of a subordinate general, the famous military writer Feuquières, converted the hard-won local success into a brilliant victory. William had begun to move troops from his centre and left to the right in order to meet the great assault on Neerwinden. Feuquières, observing this, led the cavalry of the French centre once again straight at the entrenchments. This time the French squadrons, surprising the Allies in the act of maneuvering, rode over every body of troops they met, nothing remained for the Allies but a hurried retreat over the Gete. Hundreds died crossing the river. A stubborn rearguard of English and Scottish troops led by William himself saved the Allied army, of which all but the left wing was exhausted and in disorder.
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