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  • Alberich (World War I German operation)
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  • Soon after taking over from Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff in September 1916, Paul von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, First Generalquartiermeister ordered the building of a new defensive line east of the Somme battlefront from Arras to Laon. Ludendorff was unsure as to whether retreating to the Hindenburg Line was the best thing to do, since he believed withdrawing might diminish the morale of German soldiers and civilians. The possibility of an offensive was considered if enough reserves could be assembled in the new year. A study suggested that seventeen divisions might be made available but that this was far too few for a decisive effect in the west. He was forced to accept the plan by Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, commander of Army Group Rupprecht (1st, 2nd, 6th a
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  • Soon after taking over from Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff in September 1916, Paul von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, First Generalquartiermeister ordered the building of a new defensive line east of the Somme battlefront from Arras to Laon. Ludendorff was unsure as to whether retreating to the Hindenburg Line was the best thing to do, since he believed withdrawing might diminish the morale of German soldiers and civilians. The possibility of an offensive was considered if enough reserves could be assembled in the new year. A study suggested that seventeen divisions might be made available but that this was far too few for a decisive effect in the west. He was forced to accept the plan by Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, commander of Army Group Rupprecht (1st, 2nd, 6th and 7th Armies from the Somme front to the North Sea Coast) over the objections of the First and Second Army commanders. Other options such as a shorter withdrawal were also canvassed. Manpower made the decision inevitable, since even with reinforcements from the Eastern Front the German army in the west numbered only 154 divisions against 190 Allied, many of which were larger. A move back to the Hindenburg Line (Siegfried Stellung) would shorten the front by and save the manpower of 13 divisions. The order for the withdrawal to begin was issued on 16 March. Rupprecht was appalled by the scale and methods proposed for a scorched earth policy that would accompany the withdrawal. He decided to resign but reversed his position when it was concluded that him leaving his command might suggest a rift had developed between Bavaria and the rest of Germany.