| abstract | - Russia viewed the Caucasus front as secondary to the Eastern Front and the Eastern Front enjoyed the major share of Russian resources. Russia had taken the fortress of Kars from the Turks during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and feared a Caucasus Campaign aimed at retaking Kars and the port of Batum. The Ottoman generalship and organization were negligible compared to the Russians. A Caucasus Campaign would have a distracting effect on Russian forces. The plan found sympathy with German advisors in that a success in this region would mean a diversion of Russian forces to this front from the Polish and Galician fronts. Germany supplied resources and the Ottoman 3rd Army was used in the battle. The immediate strategic goal of the Caucasus Campaign was to retake Artvin, Ardahan, Kars, and the port of Batum. As a longer term goal, head of the Ottoman war ministry İsmail Enver hoped a success would facilitate opening the route to Tbilisi and beyond, with a revolt of Caucasian Muslims. Another Turkish—or rather German—strategic goal was to cut Russian access to its hydrocarbon resources around the Caspian Sea. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company had exclusive rights to work petroleum deposits throughout the Persian Empire except in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Mazendaran, Asdrabad and Khorasan. In 1914, before the war, the British government had contracts with the company for the supply of fuel oil for the navy.
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