| abstract | - The Afghan National Army (ANA) is the main branch of the military of Afghanistan and is responsible for land-based military operations or ground warfare to defend the nation against foreign military incursions. It is under the Ministry of Defense in Kabul and is assembled by NATO states. The Kabul Military Training Center and the National Military Academy of Afghanistan serve as the main compounds for training the new army. The Afghan Defense University (ADF), after completion, will serve as the primary educational institution for the army as well as the Afghan Air Force. The ANA is divided into six regional Corps, with about 180,000 active troops as of December 2011, although others claim only 100,000 troops are active. The current Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army is Lt. Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi. Afghanistan's army traces its roots to the early 18th-century when the Hotaki dynasty was established in Kandahar followed by Ahmad Shah Durrani's rise to power. It was reorganized in 1880 during Emir Abdur Rahman Khan's reign. During World War I and World War II, Afghanistan remained a neutral state. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the army of Afghanistan was equipped by the Soviet Union. By 1992, the national army fragmented into regional militias under various local warlords. This was followed by the Taliban government in the mid 1990s, which was minimally supported by the armed forces of Pakistan. After the end of the Taliban rule in late 2001, the new Afghan National Army was formed by NATO states. Billions of dollars worth of military equipment, facilities, and other forms of aid has been provided to the ANA. Some of the weapons arrived from the United States, which included Humvees and other trucks, M-16 assault rifles, body armored jackets as well as other types of vehicles and military equipment. It also included the building of a national military command center, with training compounds in different parts of the country. To thwart and dissolve anti-government militant groups, the Karzai administration began offering cash and vocational training to encourage members to join the nation's security forces. NATO is expanding the Afghan armed forces to about 260,000 active personnel by 2015, a move supported and funded primarily by the United States Department of Defense. There were more than 4,000 American military trainers in late 2009 and additional numbers from other NATO member states, providing advanced warfare training to the Afghan armed forces and police. ==History== The modern army has its roots to the Hotaki dynasty which was formed in April 1709, before the establishment of the Afghan Empire by Ahmad Shah Durrani. In 1880 Amir Abdur Rahman Khan established a newly equipped Afghan army with help from the British. The Afghan army was more modernized by King Amanullah Khan in the early 20th century just before the Third Anglo-Afghan War. King Amanullah and his Afghan army fought against the British in 1919, resulting in Afghanistan becoming fully independent after the Treaty of Rawalpindi was signed. The Afghan army was further upgraded during King Zahir Shah's reign, starting in 1933. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the Afghan army received training and equipment mostly from the former Soviet Union. Before the 1978 Marxist revolution, according to military analyst George Jacobs, the armed forces included "some three armored divisions (570 medium tanks plus T 55s on order), eight infantry divisions (averaging 4,500 to 8,000 men each), two mountain infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a guards regiment (for palace protection), three artillery regiments, two commando regiments, and a parachute battalion (largely grounded). All the formations were under the control of three corps level headquarters. All but three infantry divisions were facing Pakistan along a line from Bagram south to Khandahar." After the coup, desertions swept the force, affecting the loyalty and moral values of soldiers, there were purges on patriotic junior and senior officers, and upper class Afghan aristocrats in society. Gradually the army's three armoured divisions (4th and 15th at Kabul/Bagram and 7th at Khandahar) and now sixteen infantry divisions dropped in size to between battalion and regiment sized, with no formation stronger than about 5,000 troops. During the 1980s Soviet war in Afghanistan, the national army of Afghanistan was involved in fighting against the mujahideen rebel groups. A big problem in the Afghan army became deserters or defectors. The Afghan army's casualties were as high as 50–60,000 and another 50,000 deserted the armed forces. The Afghan army's defection rate was about 10,000 per year between 1980–89, the average deserters left the Afghan army after the first five months. By 1992, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the fall of the communist regime in Kabul, the Soviet-trained army splintered between the government in Kabul and the various warring factions. By mid 1994 for example, there were two parallel 6th Corps operating in the north. Abdul Rashid Dostam's 6th Corps was based at Pul-i-Khumri and had three divisions. The Defence Ministry of the Kabul government's 6th Corps was based at Kunduz and also had three divisions, two sharing numbers with formations in Dostum's corps. During that time local militia forces were formed or the former Soviet era national army units 'regionalised;' both provided security for their own people living in the territories they controlled. The country was factionalized with different warlords controlling the territories they claimed, and there was no officially recognized national army in the country. This era was followed by the Taliban regime in 1996, which removed the militia forces and decided to control the country by Islamic Sharia law. The Taliban also began training its own army troops and commanders, some of whom were secretly trained by the intelligence agency (ISI) or Pakistani Armed Forces in the border region on the Durand Line. After the removal of the Taliban government in late 2001, private armies or militia forces took over security around the country. Formations in existence by the end of 2002 included the 1st Army Corps (Nangrahar), 2nd Army Corps (Kandahar, dominated by Gul Agha Sherzai and his allies), 3rd Army Corps (Paktia, where the US allegedly attempted to impose Atiquallah Ludin as commander), 4th Army Corps (Herat, dominated by Ismail Khan), 6th Army Corps at Kunduz, 7th Army Corps (under Atta Mohammad Noor at Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh Province), 8th Army Corps (at Shiberghan, dominated by Dostum's National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) and the Central Army Corps around Kabul. The new Afghan National Army was founded with the issue of a decree by President Hamid Karzai on December 1, 2002. Upon his election Karzai set a goal of an army of at least 70,000 men by 2009. However, many western military experts as well as the Defense Minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahim Wardak, believed that the nation needed at least 200,000 active troops in order to defend it from enemy forces. The first new Afghan battalion was trained by British Army personnel of the International Security Assistance Force, becoming 1st Battalion, Afghan National Guard. Yet while the British troops provided high quality training, they were few in number. After some consideration, it was decided that U.S. Army Special Forces might be able to provide the training. Thus follow-on battalions were recruited and trained by 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group of Ft. Bragg, NC, under the command of LTC McDonnell. 3rd SFG built the training facilities and ranges for early use, using a Soviet built facility on the eastern side of Kabul, near the then ISAF headquarters. The first training commenced in May 2002, with a difficult but successful recruitment process of bringing hundreds of new recruits in from all parts of Afghanistan. Early training was done in Pashto and Dari (Persian) and some Arabic due to the very diverse ethnicities. By January 2003 just over 1,700 soldiers in five Kandaks (Pashto for battalions) had completed the 10-week training course, and by mid 2003 a total of 4,000 troops had been trained. Approximately 1,000 ANA soldiers were deployed in the US-led Operation Warrior Sweep, marking the first major combat operation for Afghan troops. Initial recruiting problems lay in the lack of cooperation from regional warlords and inconsistent international support. The problem of desertion dogged the force in its early days: in the summer of 2003, the desertion rate was estimated to be 10% and in mid-March 2004, estimate suggested that 3,000 soldiers had deserted. Some recruits were under 18 years of age and many could not read or write. Recruits who only spoke the Pashto language experienced difficulty because instruction was usually given through interpreters who spoke Dari. In March 2004, fighting erupted in the western city of Herat between Ismail Khan's private army and the Defense Ministry's 4th Corps militia. Ismail Khan's son Mirwais Sadiq was killed by a rocket-propelled grenade during the military standoff between his father and the Defense Ministry's Herat Division commander, General Abdul Zaher Nayebzadah. The death toll from the fighting was estimated at 50 to 100 people. In response to the fighting, about 1,500 Afghan National Army troops were deployed to Herat. The ANA were sent to the garrison of the 17th Herat Division of the Defense Ministry's 4th Corps – General Abdul Zaher Nayebzadah's headquarters. The 17th Division headquarters had been overrun by Ismail Khan's private militia on 21 March. Soldiers in the new army initially received $30 a month during training and $50 a month upon graduation, though the basic pay for trained soldiers has since risen to $165. This starting salary increases to $230 a month in an area with moderate security issues and to $240 in those provinces where there is heavy fighting. About 95% of the men and women serving in the military are paid by electronic funds transfer. Special biometrics are used during the registration of each soldier. ==Current status==The Afghan National Army is funded mainly by the United States through the U.S. Department of Defense, and is trained and supplied by different branches of the United States armed forces. Other NATO nations have also made contributions to the rebuilding of the military of Afghanistan. ===Issues with new trainees=== According to a 2009 news report, the Afghan National Army was plagued by inefficiency and corruption. U.S. training efforts have been drastically slowed by the corruption, widespread illiteracy, vanishing supplies, and lack of discipline. Jack Kem, deputy to the commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, stated that the literacy rate in the ANA will reach over 50% by January 2012. What began as a voluntary literacy program became mandatory for basic army training in early 2011. However, Kern's definition of "literacy" is the ability to read at the third grade level, which is insufficient to master the technical and clerical skills in a modern army. In some cases, US trainers have reported missing vehicles, weapons and other military equipment, and outright theft of fuel provided by the U.S. Death threats have also been leveled against some U.S. officers who tried to stop Afghan soldiers from stealing. Some Afghan soldiers often find improvised explosive devices and snip the command wires instead of marking them and waiting for U.S. forces to come to detonate them. The Americans say this just allows the insurgents to return and reconnect them. US trainers frequently must remove the cell phones of Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation will be compromised by bragging, gossip and reciprocal warnings. In other cases American trainers spend large amounts of time verifying that Afghan rosters are accurate — that they are not padded with “ghosts” being “paid” by Afghan commanders who quietly collect the bogus wages. It was reported in 2009 that in one green unit in Baghlan Province, some soldiers have been found cowering in ditches rather than fighting. Some were suspected of collaborating with the Taliban against the Americans or engaging in reciprocal exchanges on offensives or unsanctioned psychological warfare through boasts or using their knowledge to communicate with friends or family in the battlezone. "They don’t have the basics, so they lay down," said Capt. Michael Bell, who is one of a team of U.S. and Hungarian mentors tasked with training Afghan soldiers. "I ran around for an hour trying to get them to shoot, getting fired on. I couldn’t get them to shoot their weapons.". For example, in multiple firefights during the February, 2010 NATO offensive in Helmand Province, many Afghan soldiers did not aim — they pointed their American-issued M-16 rifles in the rough direction of the incoming small-arms fire and pulled their triggers without putting rifle sights to their eyes. Their rifle muzzles were often elevated several degrees high. During the epic battle for Combat Outpost Keating in October 2009, when the Taliban attacked the fort with frontal assaults, the Afghan soldiers ran away, hid under their beds, and stole personal property from the barracks of the Americans who were then fighting hand-to-hand to defend the outpost. Eight American soldiers died and twenty-two others were wounded in the battle. Desertion has been a consistent problem since 2002. One in every four combat soldiers quited the ANA during the 12-month period ending in September 2009, according to data from the U.S. Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan. The problem was so severe that the army is forced to write off 2,000 soldiers and officers in a usual month. In order to filter potential deserters from the rank, some of the soldiers are trained by being deployed in real operations. Desertion increased in 2011, reaching an annualized rate of 34.5 percent, according to data from the Nato Military Training Center - Afghanistan, with one in every three soldiers quiting during this 12-month period. Included in the controversy of developing the ANA, Germany alleged that the US military took 15% of €50 million the German government gave to a trust fund to build up the ANA. According to Marin Strmecki, a member of the Defense Policy Board and a former top Pentagon adviser on Afghanistan in a speech to the United States Senate, "the Afghan Army should increase to 250,000 soldiers... Only when Afghan security forces reaches those numbers would they achieve the level necessary for success in counterinsurgency." In 2009, U.S. Barack Obama called for an expansion of the Afghan National Army to 260,000 soldiers. The cost would reach $20 billion and provide the army with more modern equipment. Sales of US Arms to Afghanistan alone totaled nearly $20 billion for fiscal years 2009 through 2011.Mohammad Zahir AzimiThe Globe and Mail
- The Afghan National Army or ANA is featured briefly in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 as an allied faction of the U.S. Army Rangers and in Call of Duty: Strike Team. In Modern Warfare 2, their personnel are seen at the very beginning of the campaign being trained by Sergeant Foley and PFC Joseph Allen in "S.S.D.D.", and are also seen in the following mission, "Team Player", helping General Shepherd and the U.S. Army Rangers fight the OpFor.
- The Afghan National Army (or ANA) are the collected armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan. They fight with the player on several occasions during Medal of Honor (2010). They are seen wearing basic military uniform and are reasonably accurate to reality. They are allied with the player against the Taliban insurgents.
- The Afghan National Army is the ground forces branch of the Afghan Armed Forces. It currently works alongside military personnel of various countries who provide suport and training.
|
