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South Armagh Sniper (1990–97)

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One of the first leaders of the Provisional IRA, Seán Mac Stíofáin, supported the use of snipers in his book Memories of a Revolutionary, attracted by the motto "one shot, one kill". The majority of soldiers shot dead in 1972, the bloodiest year of the conflict in Northern Ireland, fell, in effect, victims of IRA snipers. About 180 British soldiers, Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and prison staff members were killed in this way from 1971 to 1991. The AR-18 Armalite rifle became the weapon of choice for IRA members at this time.

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RUC patrols Several Army sections 2 1

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The Troubles and Operation Banner

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March 1990 to March 1997

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Staff Sergeant Gaz Hunter Captain Rupert Thorneloe Frank McCabe

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A "Sniper at Work" sign in Crossmaglen

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7 1 2

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Mobility of foot patrols further restricted

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Another soldier in Belfast and an RUC officer in County Fermanagh were killed by IRA snipers in the same period

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British Army RUC 22

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southern County Armagh

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South Armagh sniper campaign

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One of the first leaders of the Provisional IRA, Seán Mac Stíofáin, supported the use of snipers in his book Memories of a Revolutionary, attracted by the motto "one shot, one kill". The majority of soldiers shot dead in 1972, the bloodiest year of the conflict in Northern Ireland, fell, in effect, victims of IRA snipers. About 180 British soldiers, Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and prison staff members were killed in this way from 1971 to 1991. The AR-18 Armalite rifle became the weapon of choice for IRA members at this time. The British Army assessment of the conflict, Operation Banner, asserted that the IRA sniping skills often did not match those expected from a well trained sniper. The report identifies four different patterns of small arms attacks during the IRA campaign, the last being that developed by the South Armagh sniper units.