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  • Plan for Completion of Combined Bomber Offensive
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  • The plan was commissioned by a February 12, 1944 memorandum from F. L. Anderson (Deputy Commander, Operations) to include the following "By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZ": a. Summary of the Status of the CBO b. Study of Possible Target systems and Operational Policies. c. Study of the Possibilities of Heavy Bomber Participation in Direct Support of OVERLORD. d. Plans Supplementing the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan: (1) For continuing the Strategic Air Offensive after destruction of GAF production. (2) And for simultaneous support of OVERLORD in so far as conditions warrant at the moment. …
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abstract
  • The plan was commissioned by a February 12, 1944 memorandum from F. L. Anderson (Deputy Commander, Operations) to include the following "By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZ": a. Summary of the Status of the CBO b. Study of Possible Target systems and Operational Policies. c. Study of the Possibilities of Heavy Bomber Participation in Direct Support of OVERLORD. d. Plans Supplementing the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan: (1) For continuing the Strategic Air Offensive after destruction of GAF production. (2) And for simultaneous support of OVERLORD in so far as conditions warrant at the moment. … Spaatz (commander of the USAAF Eight Air Force) presented the plan to General Henry H. Arnold (Chief of the USAAF) on March 5, 1944. The plan stated that the operations to bring the German fighter force into a battle of attrition (operation Pointblank) instead of targeting "can best be achieved by attacks on objectives which are so vital to the German War Machine that they must defend them with everything they have, or face the rapid reduction of their military forces to impotence."[citation needed] After the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and the U.S. Petroleum Attache endorsed the plan on March 6; Dwight D. Eisenhower decided on March 25, 1945, that the six months for priority bombing of oil facilities to have an effect on Operation Overlord was too long and instead, railway targets became the highest priority. This was carried out under the Transportation Plan