| rdfs:comment | - The battle at the start of December 2005 in the Chadian capital N'djamena came as no surprise. For the years prior to the eruption, the Sudanese government was trying to overthrow the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, using Chadian rebels as middle men. The three armed groups involved in one of the most recent attacks in 2008 were all extensively armed by Sudanese security forces, which had the clear intent of cutting off the support that Déby was giving to the rebels in Darfur, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had been on the offensive in Darfur. The current war in Chad is a result of four distinct forces.
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| abstract | - The battle at the start of December 2005 in the Chadian capital N'djamena came as no surprise. For the years prior to the eruption, the Sudanese government was trying to overthrow the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, using Chadian rebels as middle men. The three armed groups involved in one of the most recent attacks in 2008 were all extensively armed by Sudanese security forces, which had the clear intent of cutting off the support that Déby was giving to the rebels in Darfur, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had been on the offensive in Darfur. The current war in Chad is a result of four distinct forces. For one, the war appeared to be a continuation of the conflicts of Darfur and Chad, which include the competition for power and land. Secondly, there was an internal Chadian conflict. Déby reverted to a one-man military rule after a hopeful broadening of the base of his regime in the late 1990s which was coupled by the growth of civil politics in N'djamena. Déby relied heavily on a close-knit group of kinsmen and on claiming the alloted government finances for his own agenda, distributing aid in return for civilian loyalty. Third is Khartoum's (capital of Sudan) strategy for managing security within its border, which include treating the weak surrounding states as merely extensions of its internal limits. The Sudan security helped bring Déby to power in 1990 as part of their responsibility that also saw it engage militarily in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic over the military decade. In the same way that Khartoum used a combination of extortion and retribution to control its provincial elites in Darfur, it uses the same tools to influence its trans-border limits. Furthermore, the regional competition for dominance through an immense area of central Africa has rarely been governed by state authority. This boondock includes Chad, , and northern DRC, as well as the areas of Tripoli, Sudan, Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, and even Asmara are competing for influence across this area, as well as Khartoum.
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